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United States v. Emerson and the
Second Amendment
BY WADE MAXWELL RHYNE*

"A well regulatedMilitia, being necessary to the security of a free
of the people to keep and bearArms, shall not be
State,
the right
"A
infringed.
I. INTRODUCTION
On March 30, 1999, a federal judge for the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Texas did something no federal
court had done in more than 60 years.2 District Judge Sam Cummings
held that the Second Amendment guarantees an individual's right to
own a gun.3 The case dealt with a federal statute which prohibited
possession of a firearm by anyone under a restraining order. The
issue was whether the Second Amendment protects only the states'
rights to arm their own military forces, or whether it actually protects
an individual's right to bear arms.4 This debate over the meaning of
the Second Amendment has been a source of argument among
constitutional law scholars for more than twenty years. Now this
question is about to spill out of the ivory tower and flow directly into
the real world of guns and gun control.5 "American history has often
seen social and political problems transformed into constitutional
issues. The gun control issue is no exception to this phenomenon, and
particular attention has been focused on the Second Amendment to

* University of California, Hastings College of the Law, class of 2001. Special thanks
to Professor Calvin Massey for his patient assistance and availability in composing this
Note. The Author also dedicates this Note to his family for their love and support.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
2. Eugene Volokh, Guns and the Constitution,WALL ST. J., Apr. 12, 1999, at A23.

3. See id.
4. See ild.
5. See Richard Willing, Texas Case Could Shape the Future of Gun Control, USA
TODAY, Aug. 27,1999, at 1A.
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the United States Constitution... .,6 There has been very little case
law construing the individual right question with respect to the
Second Amendment. As a result, United States v. Emerson7 could
very well be the catalyst that forces a final answer to the question of
whether or not there is an individual right to own a firearm.
If the Fifth Circuit upholds Emerson, the result will be in conflict
with prior appellate decisions.8 The likely result would be review by
the United States Supreme Court and determination of whether or
not there is such an individual right. If the individual right position
continues to prevail, as it has in Texas, the right of an individual to
own a gun and the interests of the government to control that right
will officially clash for the first time. The key word is the word,
"right." Should there actually be an individual "right" to own a gun?
The bounds of that right will have to be drawn. Once a right is
involved, presumably the whole picture changes with respect to
government action affecting that right. "Any law impacting on that
right might have to pass a much stricter test."9
This Note analyzes the district court decision in United States v
Emerson by explaining how the court reached its decision. With
respect to the states' rights versus the individual rights schools of
thought, this Note delves into these two competing theories and
explains which is superior. In doing so, the soundness of these
competing schools of thought is examined historically, textually,
doctrinally, prudentially, and structurally." Assuming that there is in
fact an individual right to bear arms provided in the Constitution, this
Note then proposes a level of scrutiny and subsequent test for the
government's curtailment of that individual right. My goal is to
define the outer boundaries of the permissible limits that the
government may put on the individual right to own a gun. Lastly, this
Note critiques the Emerson court's rationale in light of the new
proposed test.
II. BACKGROUND OF UNITED STATES v. EMERSON
The facts leading up to Emerson began in August of 1998 when a
6. Roy G. Weatherup, Standing Armies And Armed Citizens: An HistoricalAnalysis
of the Second Amendment, HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 961,962 (1975)(citation omitted).
7. See United States v. Emerson, 46 F Supp. 598 (N.D. Tex. 1999).
8. See Willing, supra note 5, at 1A.
9. Id.
10.

SEE PHILIP BoBrr-r, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION

7-8 (1982).
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26-year old nurse, Sacha Emerson, filed for divorce from her
husband, 41-year old, Dr. Timothy Emerson." In addition to filing
for divorce, Sacha Emerson also filed an application for a temporary
restraining order.'2 The application for the temporary restraining
order sought to enjoin Dr. Emerson from engaging in various
financial transactions in order to maintain the financial status quo.'3
The application also sought to enjoin Dr. Emerson from making any
threatening communications upon his wife during the pendency of the
divorce proceedings."4 The application itself was a form order that is
frequently used in Texas divorce procedures.'5 The petition stated no
factual basis for relief other than the necessary recitals required under
the Texas Family Code regarding domicile, service of process, dates
of marriage and separation, and the "insupportability" of the
marriage. 6
The 119th District Court of Tom Green County, Texas, held a
hearing on the merits of Sacha Emerson's application for the
restraining order on September 4, 1998."7 Dr. Emerson appeared at
the hearing pro se,8 while Sacha Emerson was represented by her
attorney. 9 During the course of the proceeding, Sacha Emerson
testified regarding her financial situation with respect to her
requirements in the way of child support and spousal support.'z Sacha
Emerson also expressed her desires regarding temporary
conservatorship of their minor child.21 In the course of the hearing,
Sacha Emerson alleged that Dr. Emerson threatened over the
telephone to kill the man with whom she had been having an
adulterous affair.'
The Honorable John E. Sutton granted the
boilerplate temporary restraining order despite the fact that there was
no evidence adduced regarding any acts of violence or threats of

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

See Willing, supra note 5, at 1A.
See Emerson, 46 F. Supp.2d at 599.
See id.
See id.
See iL
See id.
See id
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id-

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 28

violence by Dr. Emerson against any member of his family.23
Moreover, the court made no findings of any sort of violence or
threats of violence by Dr. Emerson, and further failed to admonish
Dr. Emerson that he would be subject to federal criminal prosecution
for doing nothing more than possessing a firearm while being subject
to the temporary restraining order.24

The statute under which Dr. Emerson was indicted for violating
is an obscure federal law which bars gun possession by anyone who is
under such a restraining order.' The actual violation occurred when
Dr. Emerson failed to dispose of his firearms and was subsequently
prosecuted under the federal law "for gun possession, rather than gun
misuse." 6 As a result, Dr. Emerson was indicted for possession of a
firearm while being under a restraining order, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(8), which states that:
(g) It shall be unlawful for any person(8) who is subject to a court order that(A) was issued after a hearing of which such person received
actual notice, and at which such person had an opportunity to
participate;
(B) restrains such person from harassing, stalking, or
threatening an intimate partner of such person or child of such
intimate partner or person, or engaging in other conduct that
would place an intimate partner in reasonable fear of bodily
injury to the partner or child; and
(C) (i) includes a finding that such person represents a credible
threat to the physical safety of such intimate partner or child; or
(ii) by its terms explicitly prohibits the use, attempted use,
or threatened use of physical force against such intimate
partner or child that would reasonably be expected to cause
bodily injury ....
2'7
Dr. Emerson moved to dismiss the indictment by challenging 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) as an unconstitutional exercise of congressional
power under the Commerce Clause and the Second, Fifth, and Tenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution.'
United States District Judge Sam Cummings held that 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(8) violated both the Second Amendment and Dr. Emerson's
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

See id.
See id.
See Volokh, supra note 2, at A23.
Id.
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) (1992).
See Emerson, 46 F. Supp.2d at 599, 614.
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Fifth Amendment due process rights to be subject to prosecution
without proof of knowledge that he was violating the statute. 29
The decision has taken many, on both sides of the firearm
debate, by surprise. President Reagan appointed Judge Cummings to
the federal bench and he has since had a reputation as being a
"middle-of-the-road" jurist, who rarely sets aside indictments.' Many
people recognized the importance of the case.
The National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and the National Rifle
Association filed briefs in support of Dr. Emerson's argument that
there is an individual right to own a gun, while a collection of fortyfive law professors and legal historians filed briefs in support of the
states' rights side of the argument. 1
II. COMPETING SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT: STATES'
RIGHTS v. INDIVIDUAL RIGHT
In relying on the Second Amendment, the only way for Dr.
Timothy Emerson to prevail on appeal is if the Second Amendment is
construed to actually guarantee him a personal right to own a firearm.
For the Fifth Circuit, this is an issue of first impression. The district
court opinion refers to the competing positions as the "[t]wo main
schools of thought." 33 This portion of the Note will discuss these
polar schools of thought and determine which is more constitutionally
sound.
There are various ways in which to critique a constitutional
argument.
Phillip Bobbit offers a typology of the types of
constitutional arguments which are found in judicial opinions,
hearings, and briefs.' Phillip Bobbit advocates that arguments are
conventions and that the most important thing is that the Supreme
Court hears arguments, reads arguments, and ultimately writes
arguments, all with specific conventions. "It is not relevant for the
time being whether constitutional arguments decide cases or are the
decision itself, by which I mean that they form the structure of
meaning the case ultimately achieves as precedent." 6 Bobbitt offers
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

See id at 612.
See Willing, supra note 5, at 1A.
See id
See Emerson, 46 F. Supp.2d at 600.
Id.
See Bobbitt, supranote 10, at 6.
See id. at 6-7.
Id. at 6.
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five types of constitutional argument, which he refers to as
archetypes, because many arguments take on aspects of more than
one type."
The first form of argument is the historical argument. The
historical argument approaches a constitutional issue by marshalling
the intent of draftsmen of the Constitution and the individuals who
subsequently adopted it23 Historical argument focuses largely on the
thoughts, beliefs, and motivations of specific time periods in order to
discern intent. These arguments begin with assertions regarding "the
controversies, the attitudes, and decisions of the period during which
the particular constitutional provision to be construed was proposed
and ratified."39
The second argument is the textual argument, which is extracted
from examining the current sense of the words of the debated
provision. "At times textual argument is confused with historical
argument, which requires the consideration of evidence extrinsic to
the text."40 Textual argument appears to have potential to be
misleading if taken by itself because the present sense of words can
often have differing meanings over the course of time. As such, it
would seem logical to always consider other forms of argument in
connection with textual analysis. Those who strictly subscribe to the
textual argument, however, read the contemporary meaning of the
text without regard to any peripheral sources.
The third argument is the structural argument. "Structural
arguments are claims that a particular principle or practical result is
implicit in the structures of government and the relationships that are
'' 1
created by the Constitution among citizens and governments. 0
The fourth form of constitutional argument, according to
Bobbitt, is the prudential argument. This form of argument "is selfconscious to the reviewing institution and need not treat the merits of
the particular controversy (which itself may or may not be
constitutional), instead advancing particular doctrines according to
the practical wisdom of using the courts in a particular way."'
The last type of constitutional argument covered is the doctrinal
argument. The doctrinal argument professes principles originating
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

See id at 7.
See id.
Id.
Id. (citation omitted).
Id.
Id.
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from precedent or from judicial or academic commentary on that
precedent.4 3 For example:
[o]ne will not find in the text of the Constitution the phrases
'two-tier review' or 'original package' or any of the other
necessary and ephemeral modes of analysis by which the
Constitution is adapted to the common law case method, yet
these doctrines are every bit as potent as those phrases
originally printed in Philadelphia. 44
Bobbitt stresses that his typology of constitutional arguments is
not inclusive, nor a list of wholly independent forms, nor the only
plausible division of constitutional arguments.4'5 Disputes may arise in
the weight that should be given to each respective argument.
Depending on which school of thought a person subscribes, that
person will likely prefer certain arguments over others. Nonetheless,
these forms of arguments provide a road map and a logical structure
to analyze and compare both the individual right and states' right
theories.
A. HISTORICAL ARGUMENT

Analyzing the Second Amendment by way of a historical
argument requires an accurate determination of the original
understanding of the Second Amendment. To be complete, this
analysis should cover the historical context under which the Second
Amendment was written.
"Historically, the right to keep and bear arms has been closely
intertwined with questions of political sovereignty, the right of
revolution, civil and military power, military organization, crime and
personal security."' This Second Amendment was written with a
purpose, not by accident; "it was the product of centuries of AngloAmerican legal and political experience."' 7 In order to fully explore
the historical argument, it is necessary to address the origin of the
Second Amendment in English history and trace its development
through the revolutionary era in America and the subsequent
ratification of the amendment in the Constitution.

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

See iL
Id
See iL at 8.
Weatherup, supra note 6, at 964.
Il
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1. English History
Examining English history provides some explanation of the
Founding Fathers' intent in writing the Second Amendment. As
early as 690 AD, Englishmen were required to possess arms and to
serve in the military.' This trend continued for centuries, requiring
the noble, and later, even the commoners, to keep and bear arms and
participate in the militia.49 The origin of the need to keep and bear

arms was not only to provide military service but also to provide
police service locally and to protect their villages in self defense."
By the middle of the seventeenth century, any individual right to
keep and bear arms in England was eroding. Foreign wars had made
the development of a standing army inevitable and it reached 16,000
men by the end of the reign of Charles II." As a result, guns were
seized from the hands of the common people. Specifically, a 1670
statute stated that no person other than the heirs of nobility, could
have a gun unless he owned land which had a value of 100 pounds per
year."
In 1685, the Catholic Duke of York ascended to the throne of
James II." Shortly thereafter, the new king was able to crush a
rebellion, and in the process succeeded in almost doubling the
standing army to 30,000 men. Moreover, this huge army was
quartered in private homes. James II was similar to Charles II in that
they both urged abandonment of the militia in favor of standing
armies. Gun rights were not the only rights which were being eroded
by the tyranny. Protestants and Catholics were forbidden from
holding high positions politically or militarily. English parliament was
not supportive of these ideas and as a result the King's policies were
achieved "through extraparliamentary means."54 The courts armed
the King with the ability to dispense with statutes as he saw fit and
subsequently his desire to abandon the militia was attainable.
"Eventually James II fled England during what was later termed

48. See David T. Hardy, Armed Citizens, Citizen Armies: Toward a Jurisprudenceof
the Second Amendment, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 559,562 (1986).
49. See id. at 563-65.
50. See CLAYTON E. CRAMER, FOR THE DEFENSE OF THEMSELVES AND THE
STATE: THE ORIGINAL INTENT AND JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE RIGHT To

KEEP AND BEAR ARMS 24-25 (1994).

51.
52.
53.
54.

See Weatherup, supra note 6, at 970.
See id. (citing Game Preservation Act, 22 Car.2, c. 25, § 3 (1670)).
See id. at 971.
Id. at 972.
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the Glorious Revolution."'55 Soon thereafter, English parliament
passed the English Bill of Rights that codified the individual right to
bear arms. Specifically it read:
"5. That the raising or keeping a Standing Army within the
Kingdom in Time of Peace unless it be with the Consent of
Parliament is against Law.
6. That the Subjects which are Protestants may have Arms for
their ,Defence
suitable to their Conditions, and as allowed by
56
Law.
The purpose and meaning of this right to have arms is clear given the
historical context in which it was written. "A paramount aim of the
Glorious Revolution of 1688 was to abolish the standing army of
James II and to reinstate the right of Protestants to keep and carry
arms."'57 England had been at odds with James II and his position
with respect to individual gun rights. James II did not support an
individual right and a principle complaint of the new Bill of Rights
was the "refusal to allow Protestants the right to carry arms for selfdefense.""8 Therefore, after England had ridden itself of James II and
his ideals regarding gun rights, parliament drafted the English Bill or
Rights so as to guarantee the individual right.
Some argue that the new English Declaration of Rights merely
confirmed prior rights that had existed. Under this view it is can be
said that an individual right to bear arms existed all along, and
Charles II and James II were blatantly violating it throughout their
rule. The result is the same. Either the individual right existed prior
to, or, was created by the English Bill of Rights. Nonetheless, the
individual right existed in England and was adopted in America as
well.
2. American Revolutionary History
"Like other Bill of Rights freedoms, the personal right to keep
and bear arms gained constitutional recognition, in great part, from
the abuses of power that led to the American Revolution."59 Initially,
England's success in enticing Englishmen to America was largely due
to the guarantee that they and their children would possess "all the
55.
56.
(1689)).
57.
58.
1956)).
59.

Emerson, 46 F. Supp.2d at 602-03 (citing Hardy, supra note 48, at 579).
Weatherup, supra note 6, at 973 (citing Bill of Rights, 1 W. & M., sess. 2, c. 2
STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED 43 (1984).
Id. at 46 (citing W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 241 (7th ed.
Id. at 58.
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rights of natural subjects, as if born and abiding in England. ' This
naturally included the individual right to bear arms, which not only
provided self-defense capabilities, but also provided England with a
reserve military force.6' However, following the French and Indian
War, England raised taxes and began to occupy the colonies with a
large standing army. 2 By 1775 the military occupation of Boston had
completely cut off its citizens from anyone outside. British General
Gage refused to allow citizens to leave unless they turned in their
firearms.' Just as in England under James II, individuals were being
stripped of the individual right to possess firearms.
"As the size and the repressive character of the standing army
increased, many Americans began to arm and to organize themselves
into independent militias."' George Washington and George Mason
created the Fairfax County Militia Association in 1774. Likewise, in
New England, Samuel Adams "urged 'our Friends to provide
themselves without Delay with Arms [and] Ammunition, get well
instructed in the military Art, embody themselves [and] prepare a
complete Set of Rules that they may be ready in Case they are called
to defend themselves against the violent Attacks of Despotism."' 6 It
was about this time when George III asked General Gage why the
rebels had not been disarmed. In reply, Gage wrote: "'Your
Lordship's ideas of disarming certain provinces.., neither is nor has
been practicable without having recourse to force, and being master
of the country." '66 This difficulty could be attributed to the fact that
the provinces "swarmed with thousand of what were called 'minute
men' 'i.e., to be ready at a minute's warning with a fortnight's
provision, and ammunition and arms."' 67 This period was fraught with
English "attempts to disarm the rebellious Americans through
arbitrary searches and seizures and a ban on exports of arms and

60. Emerson, 46 F. Supp.2d at 602 (citing JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, To
BEAR ARMS: THE ORIGINS OF AN ANGLO-AMERIcAN RIGHT 138 (1994)).

KEEP AND

61. See id.
62. See Halbrook, supra note 55, at 59.
63. See id.
64. Id. at 60.
65. Id.
66. Id. (citing J. GALVIN, THE MINUTE MEN 102 (1967)). "Indeed, that summer
Gage had written Dartmouth: 'In Worcester they keep no terms; openly threatening
resistance by arms; have been purchasing arms; preparing them; casting balls; and
providing powder...."' Id. at 55.
67. See Halbrook, supra note 55, at 60.
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colonies."'

ammunition from England to the
Ultimately, the British attempt to seize and destroy colonial arms
and ammunition at Lexington is what precipitated the revolutionary
shot heard around the world.69 It was the individual who possessed a
gun that made it possible for the American Revolution to succeed.
"A mass of farmers, mountaineers, and other commoners provided
the arms and backbone to defeat the British: 'every man capable of
bearing arms must use them in aid or in opposition to the country of
his birth.""'7
Indeed, "[iln theory and practice, the American
Revolution had both as an objective and as an indispensable means
the individual right to 71keep, bear, and use arms to check
governmental oppression.,
The existence of an individual right is also evident from an
historical perspective due to the fact that the colonies passed
declarations of rights during the Revolution that explicitly recognized
the individual right to have arms.'
More specifically, Thomas
Jefferson advocated that the Virginia Constitution contain the
provision, "'No freeman shall be debarred the use of arms,"' and in
the Declaration of Independence "he vindicated the imperative of an
armed uprising of the people, in times of oppression, against the
standing army and the established government." 73 Moreover, the
North Carolina and the Vermont Declaration of Rights contained the
clauses respectively, "that the people have a right to bear arms for the
defense of the State," and "that the people have a right to bear arms
for the defence of themselves and the State." 74
The historical context under which these documents were
drafted, was shortly after the British attempt at disarmament. This
timing strongly indicates that the colonies held the individual's right
to possess a gun as an important right that deserved protection.
a. Ratification of the Constitution
"Before the proposal of the Constitution, the newly independent
colonies had existed in a state of nature with each other, and with the
defeat of the British, no one feared that the natural and common-law
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 62.
See iU.
Id at 63.
Id. at 64.
See id
Id. at 64.
1&.
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right to have arms was any long in danger.""5 Nonetheless, after the
Constitution was offered for ratification in 1787, the controversies
and debates that arose in state conventions revealed "two basic
positions: the Federalist view that the Bill of Rights was unnecessary
because the proposed government had no positive grant of power to
deprive individuals of rights, and the anti-Federalist contention that a
formal declaration would enhance protection of those rights. 76 More
specifically, on the subject of arms, the anti-Federalists feared that

militia of the people would be overpowered by a superior standing
army, unless there was "specific recognition of the individual right to
keep and bear arms., 77 As for the Federalists, they promised that the
people would never be disarmed.
Moreover, the Federalists
advocated that the people be armed adequately enough so as to check

any oppressive standing army.78 Thus, both the Federalists and AntiFederalists respected the individual right theory.
i. "Anti-Federalist Fears: The People Disarmed, A Select Militia""
(Standing Army)
The concern of the Anti-Federalists was that with no protection
of a bill of rights the creation of a standing army would inevitably
result in the disarmament of first, the militia and next, the populace.8"
The clear solution was to have a bill of rights which guaranteed the
individual right to bear arms.
Richard Henry Lee was the most influential writer advocating
ratification of the Constitution only if it contained a Bill of Rights.8'
Lee was the author of Letters from the Federal Farmer.' Most of
Lee's proposals for the specific provisions of the bill of rights were
75. Id. at 65.
76. Id at 65-66.
77. Id. "Relevant state constitutional provisions at this time were as follows: 'That
the people have a right to bear arms for the defence of themselves and the state....'
Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights, XIII (1776); Vermont Declaration of Rights, XV
(1777), XVIII (1786). 'That the people have the right to bear arms for the defense of the
State...' North Carolina Declaration of Rights, XVIII (1776)... The following provision
was adopted during the same period in which the Bill of Rights to the U.S. Constitution
was being ratified: 'That the right of the citizens to bear arms in defense of themselves and
the State shall not be questioned.' Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights, XXI (1790);
Kentucky Declaration of Rights, XII (1792)." Id at 218 n. 80.
78. See id.
79. Id. at 69.
80. See id.
81. See id. at 70.
82. See id.

Winter 2001]

EMERSON and the SECOND AMDENDMENT

517

adopted in the Bill of Rights, some were even identically worded.'
As a result, these writings offer an excellent commentary on the
historical meaning of the provisions in the Bill of Rights that were so
vehemently fought for by the Anti-Federalists. 4 "In predicting the
early employment of a standing army through taxation, Lee
contended:
'It is true, the yeomanry of the country possess the lands, the
weight of property, possess arms, and are too strong a body of
men to be openly offended-and, therefore, it is urged, they
will take care of themselves, that men who shall govern will not
dare pay any disrespect to their opinions. It is easily perceived,
that if they have not their proper negative upon passing laws in
congress, or on the passage of laws relative to taxes and armies,
they may in twenty or thirty years be by means imperceptible to
them, totally deprived of that boasted weight and strength: This
may be done in a great measure by congress; if desposed to do
it, by modeling the militia. Should one fifth or one eighth part
of the men capable of bearing arms, be made a select militia, as
has been proposed, and those the young and ardent part of the
community, possessed of but little or no property, and all the
others put upon a plan that will render them of no importance,
the former will answer all the purposes of an army, while the
latter will be defenceless.... I see no provision made for
calling out the posse comitatus for executing the laws of the
union, but provision is made for congress to call forth the militia
for the execution of them-and the militia in general, or any
select part of it, may be called out under military officers,
instead of the sheriff to enforce an execution of federal laws, in
the first instance, and thereby introduce an entire military
execution of the laws.'8
The Anti-Federalist position was further illustrated in the
subsequent series of Letters written by Lee. In those Letters, Lee
made a list of fundamental rights which included: "the rights of free
press, petition, religion; the rights to speedy trial, trial by jury,
confrontation of accusers and against self-incrimination; the right not
to be subject to 'unreasonable searches or seizures of his person,
papers or effects'; and, in addition to the right to refuse quartering of
soldiers, 'the militia ought always to be armed and disciplined, and
the usual defense of the country... .",6 This list should look familiar

83. See id
84. See id
85. IL at 70-71. (citing R. LEE, LETTERS OF A FEDERAL FARMER 305-6 (1787-88)).
86. Id at 71 (citing R. LEE, ADDITIONAL LETTERS FROM A FEDERAL FARMER 53

(1788)).
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to anyone who has read the Bill of Rights.
The Anti-Federalist fear was that Congress, through the "'power
to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia"' under
Article I § 8 of the proposed Constitution, would result in the
creation of a select militia to be used as a tool for federal supremacy.'
The contemporary argument that is set forth by states' rights theorists
is that "it is impractical to view the militia as the whole body of the
people, and that the militia consists of the select corps now known as
the National Guard," which also existed in Lee's time.' In response
to states' rights theorists who claim the right to bear arms exists only
in the context of a state militia, Lee "refuted it in these terms:
'But, say gentlemen, the general militia are for the most part
employed at home in their private concerns, cannot vwell be
called out, or be depended upon; that we must have a select
militia; that is, as I understand it, particular corps or bodies of
young men, and of men who have but little to do at home,
particularly armed and disciplined in some measure, at the
public expense, and always ready to take the field. These corps,
not much unlike regular troops, will ever produce an inattention
to the general militia; and the consequence has ever been, and
always must be, that the substantial men, having families and
property, will generally be without arms, without knowing the
use of them, and defenseless; whereas, to preserve liberty, it is
essentialthat the whole body of the people always possess arms,
and be taughtalike, especially when young, how to use them; nor
does it follow from this, that all promiscuously must go into
actual service on every occasion. The mind that aims at a select
militia, must be influenced by a truly anti-republican principle;
and when we see many men disposed to practice upon it,
whenever they can prevail, no wonder true republicans are for
carefully guarding against it.' 9
The subsequent debate and resulting compromise demonstrate
that a "bill of rights would guarantee broad rights without being
overly detailed... [and that] the demand for a bill of rights was as
strong as the demand for independence had been a decade before."'
The one consistency throughout the ratification debate was the
"general understanding of the right to keep and bear arms as an
individual right."'"

87. Id.

88. Id.
89. Id. (citing R. LEE, supra note 88, at 170 (emphasis added)).

90. Id.
at 72.
91. Id.
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ii. "Federalist Promise: To Trust the People with Arms"9
In The Federalist, No. 28, Alexander Hamilton wrote, "If the
representatives of the people betray their constituents, there is then
no recourse left but in the exertion of that original right of selfdefense which is paramount to all positive forms of government...."9'
The Federalist position was that the Constitution conferred no
federal power to deprive the people of their rights. The government
could not seize the arms of the people. Their reasoning was simple.
There was no explicit grant of such power and therefore the state
declarations of right would prevail.94 As a result, it was the existence
of an armed populace, each with an individual right to be so armed,
that would be superior in its forces to the standing army, and not a
paper bill of rights that would check despotism.95 Since the
Constitution did not allow it, the government could not do it. People
who possessed arms had nothing to fear with respect to their
individual right to bear arms.
Today it would be a stretch of the imagination to say that any
militia of the people would stand a chance against the armed forces of
the United States. Despite the slim probability of such an occurrence,
the historical context surrounding the ratification debates of the
Second Amendment remains unchanged and should not be ignored
because it indicates the intended and original rationale behind the
Amendment. No less deference should be given to the underlying
rationale of the Federalist position just because it is old or because
today's standing armies have greater relative strength with respect to
an armed populace. Approaching the analysis from an historical
standpoint, it is clear that the Federalists, like the Anti-Federalists,
supported the individual right theory.
Another interesting historical approach of the Second
Amendment which deserves mention, is the approach advocated by
Carl T. Bogus. Bogus goes beyond the ratification debates. Bogus'
view is that the bulk of the individual right historical approach is
grounded upon "a particular wing commonly called 'insurrectionist
theory."'" Professor Bogus claims that the historical insurrectionist
92. Id. at 67.
93. Id. at 67 (citing Madison, Hamilton, and Jay, THE FEDERALIST PAPERS 180
(Arlington House ed. n.d.)).
94. See id. at 68.
95. See id.
96. Carl T. Bogus, The Hidden History of the Second Amendment, 31 U.C. DAvis L.
REV. 309,318 (1998).
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theory is "premised on the idea that the ultimate purpose of an armed
citizenry is to be prepared to fight the government itself."9
According to Professor Bogus, the amendment was not "enacted to
provide a check on government tyranny; rather, it was written to
assure the Southern states that Congress would not undermine the
slave system by using its newly acquired constitutional authority over
the militia to disarm the state militia to disarm the state militia and
thereby destroy the South's principal interest of slave control."'
Thus, the amendment was a supplement to the slavery compromise
made at the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia.
Regardless of what Bogus advocates, the fact remains that the
ratification debates suggest that there is an individual right inherent
in the Second Amendment. The Federalists and the Anti-Federalists
had different ideas about what the Constitution should contain and
what it should mean, however one unifying theme between the two
sides was that there existed an individual right to bear arms. "The
nature of the controversy over ratification of the Constitution and the
various proposals for and debate over the Bill of Rights also buttress
the individual right view, for the one thing all the Framers agreed on
was the desirability of allowing citizens to arm themselves."'" An
historical argument supports the decision that the district court
reached in United States v. Emerson.
B. TEXTUAL ARGUMENT

Textual arguments are in contrast to, but often confused with,
historical arguments." Historical arguments extract their legitimacy
from the social contract negotiated from an original position."°
Conversely, textual arguments are often mistaken for "similar
contractual arguments with the parol evidence rule strictly applied." 13
There is no consideration given to the circumstances surrounding the
written text being examined. Textual arguments can be thought of as
resting on a sort of perpetual social contract, whose terms receive
their "contemporary meanings continually reaffirmed by the refusal
97. Id. at 318-19.
98. Id. at 321.
99. See id.
100. Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibitionand the OriginalMeaning of the Second
Amendment, 82 MICH. L.R. 204,220-221 (1983).
101. See Bobbitt, supra note 10, at 25.
102. See id. at 26.
103. Id.
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of the People to amend the instrument.""' A true master of the
textual argument, according to Bobbit, was Justice Hugo Black."
The textual argument is powerful for those who wish to provide a
valve through which contemporary values can be intermingled with
the Constitution."
Conversely, textual arguments can be
inappropriate modes for accommodating positions in areas where
concepts may have changed faster than their terms have been
accepted." Moreover, textual arguments do not accommodate "the
mid-course corrections that are the indispensable navigational devices
of common law development; language simply does not change that
quickly."'" The underlying theme of the textual argument is that one
should never accept an interpretation that is incompatible with the
words of the text."
With respect to the Second Amendment and textual argument,
states' rights and individual rights theorists attempt to hang their hats
on different words within the amendment. Certain words contained
within the amendment will no doubt carry different weight,
depending on the school of thought to which you subscribe. "A well
regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the
right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.""0
In looking at the words of the Second Amendment it is easy to
see why reasonable minds could differ on its meaning from a textual
approach. This note will not limit the textual debate to solely the
contemporary meaning of the words, but instead expand the
argument on how and where these words are placed within the
amendment, therefore excepting the parole evidence nature of the
strict textual approach. In going beyond the contemporary meaning
of the words, it is important to look at how the amendment is
structured."' "The Second Amendment is widely seen as quite
unusual, because it has a justification clause as well as an operative
clause..". According to Eugene Volokh, a unique aspect of the

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
(1998).

Id.
See id.
See id. at 36.
See id.
Id at 37.
See id. at 38.
U.S. CONST. amend. II.
Not to be confused with structural arguments. See Bobbitt, supra note 10, at 7.
Eugene Volokh, The Commonplace Second Amendment, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 793
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Second Amendment is that it contains both a statement of purpose as
well as a guaranteed right to bear arms."'
States' rights theorists often suggest that the justification clause
of the Second Amendment sets forth a built-in expiration date for the
right to bear arms. The argument would sound something like,
So long as a well-regulated militia is necessary to the security of
a free state (or so long as the right to keep and bear arms
contributes to a well-regulated militia, or so long as the militia is
in fact well-regulated),... the people have a right to keep and

change and the necessity
bear arms; but once circumstances
14
disappears, so does the right.
Problematic with this contention is the actual reading of the text of
the amendment. The Second Amendment does not read, "so long as
a militia is necessary"; it reads, "being necessary.. 15 There is no
"only when" clause in the text. If the right was to be so conditioned,
as states' rights theorists suggest, the text would be clearer on that
limitation. It would not have been difficult to make the text of the
amendment conditional if that was what was intended. Since the text
has no such clear condition it stands to reason that the existence of
any condition on the right to bear arms is not as obvious as most
states' rights theorists advocate.
It is also important to recognize the fact that "the people" are
two words which are contained within the amendment. From a strict
textual analysis, "the people," means "the people." "The operative
clause [of the amendment] says that the right to keep and bear arms
belongs to "the people.' '1 6 At the risk of offending the parole
evidence rule that is usually applied to the textual argument, it is
impossible not to look at similar texts and their structure. "Given
that the 'the right of the people' is likewise used to describe the right
to petition the government, the right to be free from unreasonable

113. See id.
114. Id. at 797 (citing David C. Williams, Civic Republicanism and the Citizen Militia:
The Terrifying Second Amendment, 101 Yale L.J. 551 (1991)). "Professor Williams argues
that the well-regulated militia protects the security of a free State only so long as pretty
much everyone has arms, and so long as the arms-bearers are 'virtuous,' id. at 554; because
this is not longer the case, he argues that the right is essentially 'meaningless' and
'outdated,' id. at 554-55." Id. at 821. "See also Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Living Hand
of the Past: History and ConstitutionalJustice, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 1611 n.23 (1997)
(suggesting that Second Amendment's justification clause may mean that Amendment
protects only those gun rights that support state security, which today may mean no gun
rights at all)." Id.
115. Volokh, supranote 112, at 797.
116. Id at 800.
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searches and seizures, and the rights to keep and bear arms
recognized in various contemporaneous state constitutions-all
individual rights that belong to each person, not just to members of
'
Why
the militia-'the people' [ ] refer[s] to the people generally."117
should "the people" in the Second Amendment refer to anything
different than "the people" in the other amendments within the Bill
of Rights? It should not, and any argument otherwise is highly
speculative and bears a heavy burden of demonstrating how and why
"the people" means something different exclusively within the
Second Amendment.
It is clear whose rights are to be secured by the Amendment's
text. The Second Amendment clearly reads, "the right of the
people," just as the First, Fourth, and Ninth Amendments use this
Again, excepting the parole
phrase to refer to an individual right.'
evidence rule, the early Kentucky, Massachusetts, North Carolina,
Pennsylvania, and Vermont Bill of Rights, read of "the right of the
people to bear arms.1 . 9 "Since these provisions secure rights against
the state governments, they must recognize a right belonging to
someone other than the state or entities whose membership is defined
by the state-this likewise suggests that 'the right of the people to
12
The justification
bear arms' refers to the right of individuals.""
clause cannot "transform this rather unambiguous term into 'the right
of the States' or the 'right of the militia.''. The right to bear arms
was more than just an opportunity to bear arms under state
controlled militias. After all, "under the Militia Clauses, the federal
government could at any time take direct command of the militia
away from the states."'22 Thus, "[i]f the right was only a right to
possess arms under the supervision of one's militia superiors-who
might well be under federal command-then the right would impose
little constraint on the federal government.""
The burden that the state's right theorist must bear in
demonstrating that no individual right was intended in the text of the
Second Amendment consists of showing not just that there was a
desire to protect the states, but that there was no desire to protect
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id.
See id
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 811.
Id.
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individuals - "despite the most natural reading of the amendment's
phraseology., 124 A states' rights theorist will often attempt to cling to
the word "militia," as previously mentioned. From a textual
argument, the states' rights theorist will ignore the previous analysis
set forth by Volokh on how to read the amendment and instead stress
a strict textual approach based solely on the word "militia." This
means that "militia" will take on the contemporary meaning of the
word which is the federalized National Guard.'2 As a result, they
claim, there is no need for any individual to even have a gun. This
illustrates the flaw in the strict textual argument when read alone.
The meanings of words change over time. The 18th century
definition of militia was the whole body of able-bodied citizens
declared by law as being subject to call to military service. 6
"Invariably [the Founders] defined it in some phrases like 'the whole
body of the people,'127 while their references to the organizedmilitary-unit usage of militia, which they called a 'select militia,' were
strongly pejorative."'"
The end result was that the Framers
guaranteed the arms of the militia by guaranteeing the arms of the
individuals who made up the militia. 29
Not all the constitutional scholars share Volokh's textual views
on the Second Amendment. Saul Cornell argues that the individual
rights approach "suffers from the problem that mars so much law
office history: a failure to adequately contextualize constitutional
texts. '"3 ° He contends that "[t]o understand what a particular
historical actor meant when he wrote about the right to bear arms
requires scholars to immerse themselves in the surviving evidence
from this period and to analyze published and unpublished sources,
private comments as well as public statements.'3 1 Moreover, he
claims the individual right argument from a textual perspective has
"treated the recurring use of particular constitutional terms as
124.
125.
126.
127.

See Kates, supra note 100, at 213.
See id.
See id.
Id. See, e.g., VA. CONST. art. I, §13 (1776); DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION OF
THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, reprinted in 3 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES IN THE
SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS 425 (3d ed. 1937).
128. See Kates, supra note 100, at 216.
129. See id. at 217.
130. Saul Cornell, Commonplace Or Anachronism: The Standard Model, The Second
Amendment, and the Problem of History in Contemporary Constitutional Theory, 16
CONST. COM. 221,225 (1999).
131. Id.
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examples of commonplaces." 2 According to Cornell, the approach
ignores "the profound difference between our modern notion of the
commonplace and the way in which the eighteenth century
understood t[he] term[s]."'
It is hard to disagree with the notion that some of the terms used
in drafting and debating the Constitution have changed over time.
However, Cornell uses the meaning of the word "republicanism""M as
an example of a word that had no clear definition to those who used it
historically. With this in mind, he advocates to extend the uncertainty
that is inherent in words like "republicanism" to other words used
found in the Constitution. He writes that "[a] systematic survey of
the full range of American ideas about rights in the Revolutionary era
examining the broad range of relevant sources would be a
monumental undertaking." 35
It is difficult to subscribe to Cornell's approach because it seems
to advocate an approach which ignores many valuable sources. It is
based on the assumption that certain sources are just too risky to use,
unless of course you can use them in arguing for a collective right.
Moreover, the words used by an individual rights theorist are words
like "the people" and "the militia." While being open to debate,
these words do not possess the same degree of vagueness as does the
word "republicanism." Moreover, the search for truth should not
exclude delving into history just because it may be a difficult
endeavor.
Regardless of what the original meaning of these words were, it
is safe to say that the meaning of the word "militia" has changed
more over the course of the last two or more centuries than words
such as "people." From a strict textual approach, the opposing sides
can point to either "the people" or "the militia." In doing so, they
can pound their fists and say that one word is more essential to the
amendment than the other. But when expanding the textual
argument and excepting the parole evidence concept, it becomes clear
that the text of the amendment points to an individual right more
than it does a states' right.
The Emerson decision shares this approach. The decision seizes
on the opportunity to point out that if the Second Amendment really
means what states' rights advocates propose, "then the text would
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id.
Id. at 225-26.
See id.
Id at 227.
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read '[a] well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a
free State, the right of the States to keep and bear Arms, shall not be
infringed. ' '13 6 Moreover, the district court explained that the plain
language of the amendment, "without attenuate inferences therefrom,
shows that the function of the subordinate clause was not to qualify
the right, but instead to show why it must be protected. The right
exists independent of the militia. If this right were not protected, the
existence of the militia, and consequently the security of the state,
would be jeopardized."137 The Emerson decision also utilizes the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the phrase, "the people." It has
been held that this phrase means the same thing in the Second
Amendment as it does in "both the Preamble to the Constitution and
in the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments."" The Supreme
Court held that the phrase "the people" seems to have been a term of
art employed in select parts of the Constitution.'39 Moreover, the
Emerson decision points to the fact that the Supreme Court has also
held that "the amendments of the Bill of Rights should be read in pari
materia, and amendments which contain similar language should be
construed similarly."'40 Thus, "a textual analysis of the Second
Amendment clearly declares a substantive right to bear arms
recognized in the people of the United States.''
C. DOCTRINAL ARGUMENT

"Doctrinal argument does not depend so much on how the
drafters actually intended a specific passage to be applied as on the
application of the doctrines which serve or can be assumed to serve
general purposes sought by the drafters.', 42 The doctrinal ideology
requires that court "decisions be based on premises of general
applicability, otherwise they would be 'ad hoc' or 'legislative." 43 In
other words, the doctrinal argument asks, "[w]hat is the rationale
underlying this rule, issue, or amendment?" The doctrinal argument
has its largest challenge "when the old purposes for the development
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
(1930)).
141.
142.
143.

Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 601.
Id.
Id. (quoting United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,494 U.S. 259,265 (1990)).
See id.
Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 601 (citing Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 298
Id.
Bobbitt, supra note 10, at 57.
Id.
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of the doctrine have been obscured or mooted, or have simply
withered away, or when there is no consensus as to the discernible
purpose."1" Since, "[i]t is reasoning from purpose that gives
doctrinalism its power; it can't provide purpose," alone. 45 The
doctrinal argument seems to have a flaw in that it will inevitably bring
the two opposing sides back to the same place in which they startedarguing about the purpose behind the doctrine. After all, "the debate
over ,0,constitutional
purposes is generally the issue in Constitutional
46
law.

If there is any place where a doctrinal argument will fail, it is
Second Amendment debate. Individual rights theorists will say that
the purposes behind the doctrine of allowing people to bear arms
goes beyond the existence of a well-regulated militia. States' rights
theorists will say that the purpose underlying the doctrine was to
secure a free state by preserving the existence of the militia.
According to the states' rights argument, the people do not need to
bear arms since a well regulated militia exists. How will these two
opposing sides decipher a purpose behind the doctrine? Most likely,
they will resort to historical and textual analyses as a means of
proving the rationale underlying their position. Hence, standing
alone, the doctrinal argument is not as useful with respect to the
Second Amendment as it may be in other areas of debate.
Nevertheless, the purpose of personal security, that is defense of
self, should not go without mention when discussing the rationale of
the doctrines underlying the Second Amendment. It is undisputed
that the Second Amendment, at the very least, guarantees a militia
the right to bear arms. The rationale for this was clearly protection
and personal security from a tyrannical federal government. Personal
security and protection are non-partisan rationales underlying the
right to bear arms. With this in mind, would it make sense that the
Framers would ensure protection against a tyrannical government but
nevertheless leave the average American unprotected from criminal
attack at a local level? Should the source of the tyranny matter,
whether it be a local criminal or a criminal federal government? The
rationale is the same. The guarantee was "an individual right to
possess firearms for personal security, so that people could use
firearms against both lone criminals and criminal governments."' 7
144. Id at 55.
145. Id.
146. Id
147. David B. Kopel, It Isn't About Duck Hunting: The British Originsof the Right to

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 28

From a personal security rationale, the individual rights theorists
have a superior position. The idea that personal security includes
security from criminal governments and criminal individuals is
evidenced by the fact that the U.S. Senate rejected a proposal to limit
the right to bear arms by adding the phrase, "for the common
defense" at the end of the Second Amendment."4 Moreover, John
Adams, who drafted the Massachusetts declaration, defended the
right to carry arms in self defense and "in his study of American state
constitutions, wrote that 'arms in the hands of citizens [may] be used
at individual discretion... in private self-defence.... """
This
indicates that security, to the Framers, meant more than just security
from tyrannical government but that it also meant security in the form
of self-defense.
As a result, the doctrinal argument appears to be best utilized in
concert with another form of argument, and should be used as a form
of support while employing one of the other forms of argument. It is
impossible to discern a purpose of a doctrine without looking back
into the history of that doctrine. In the context of the Second
Amendment, the underlying rationale is clearly security. The debate
will then be left as to how narrowly we should interpret the word
"security." It seems obvious, from an historical perspective, that the
doctrine behind the Second Amendment does more than protect and
ensure security from government. As such, the doctrinal argument
also supports an individual right under the Second Amendment.
D. PRUDENTIAL ARGUMENT
Prudential argument is the constitutional argument that is
actuated by the political and economic circumstances surrounding the
decision.5
"Thus prudentialists generally hold that in times of
national emergency even the plainest of constitutional limitations can
be ignored.''. Justice Hugo Black sketched a caricature of this
approach in effort to show how ridiculous he thought the prudential
approach was.'52 He wrote a hypothetical opinion of "Judge X" with
"pompous and convoluted tones," in which the Court justifies the
Arms, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1333, 1361 (1995).

148. See HALBROOK, supra note 55, at 65 (citing 3 J. ADAMs, A DEFENSE OF THE
CONSTrrUTIONS OF GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 475 (1787-88)).
149.
150.
151.
152.

See id.
See Bobbitt, supra note 10, at 61.
Id.
See id. at 59.
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taking of a family farm by the Defense Department without
compensation "since the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment must
'
be balanced against the provision for the war power in Article I. 153
Justice Black's ridicule of this type of argument is especially
interesting due to the fact he satiriz[es] the prudentialist's favorite
passage from Marshall, and Judge X is, if anyone doesn't know,
Justice Frankfurter."' The Emerson court opinion shares Justice
Black's impatience with the prudential argument.
"Some scholars have argued that even if the original intent of the
Second Amendment was to provide an individual right to bear arms,
modem-day prudential concerns about social cost outweigh such
original intent and should govern current review of the
amendment." ' The district court, just like Justice Black, sees a
glaring problem with this type of reasoning. After all, "[i]f one does
accept the plausibility of any of the arguments on behalf of a strong
reading of the Second Amendment, but, nevertheless, rejects them in
the name of social prudence and the present-day consequences
produced by finicky adherence to earlier understandings, why do we
not apply such consequentialist criteria to each and every part of the
Bill of Rights." 56 The Emerson district court decision shares this
concern by quoting Justice Scalia's argument:
that even if there would be 'few tears shed if and when the
Second Amendment is held to guarantee nothing more than the
state National Guard, this would simply show that the Founders
were right when they feared that some future generation might
wish to abandon liberties that they considered essential, and so
sought to protect those liberties in a Bill of Rights. We may
tolerate the abridgment of property rights and the elimination
of a right to bear arms; but we should not pretend that these are
not reductions of rights.'",
Conversely, Sanford Levinson addresses the prudential argument
and agrees that "it appears almost crazy to protect as a constitutional
right something that so clearly results in extraordinary social costs
with little, if any, compensating social advantage." '58 He added that it

153. Id.
154. Id. at 60.
155. Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 609.
156. Id. (citing Sanford Levinson, The EmbarrassingSecond Amendment, 99 YALE
L.J. 661, 658 (1989) (citing D. Kates, Minimalist Interpretation of the Second Amendment
2 (draft Sept. 29,1986) (unpublished manuscript available from author))).
157. Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 610.
158. Sanford Levinson, supra note 156, at 655.
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would be "almost impossible to imagine that the judiciary would
strike down a determination by Congress that the possession of
1 9 Moreover, it
assault weapons should be denied to private citizens.""
has become easy to say that we live in a different era and that there is
no justifiable reason to "continue enforcing an outmoded, and indeed
61
dangerous, understanding of private rights against public order."' '
The argument can be made that the rise of professional police forces
who enforce the law has made "irrelevant, and perhaps counterproductive, the continuation of a strong notion of self-help as the
remedy for crime.' ' 161 This type of argument is the best approach
available to those who advocate a states' rights approach.
This note concludes, as did the district court in Emerson, that the
prudentialist argument is quite disturbing. The premises upon which
states' rights prudentialists base their arguments are flawed. First, I
strongly agree that it is "foolhardy to assume that the armed state will
necessarily be benevolent."' 2 Is history not any indication that the
states have not always been a pillar of integrity and righteousness? I
share the sentiment that "[t]he American political tradition is, for
good or ill, based in large measure on a healthy mistrust of the
state."' 63 Ideally, I would like to believe that the state, either local or
federal, is of no threat to my own values or liberty, however it is a
stretch of the imagination to see how "one can argue that
circumstances have so changed as to make mass disarmament
constitutionally unproblematic."1' 6
In furtherance of this point, Levinson points to the Chinese
student demonstrations in Tiananmen Square as proof that an
unarmed citizenry is more prone to abuse than an armed one." It is
absurd to make the argument that had those students been armed, the
massacre would have been avoided. Nonetheless, it is also absurd to
say that individuals who bear even small arms are irrelevant to the
state.'6

159. Id.
160. Id. at 656.
161. Id. Levison writes that the point is presumably demonstrated by the increasing
public opposition of police officials to private possession of handguns (not to mention

assault rifles).
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

I&
Id.
Id.
See id. at 656-57.
See id. at 657.
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Witness contemporary Northern Ireland and the territories
occupied by Israel, where the sophisticated weaponry of Great
Britain and Israel have proved almost totally beside the point.
The fact that these may not be pleasant examples does not
affect the principal point, that a state facing a totally disarmed
population is in far better position, for good or ill, to suppress
popular demonstrations and uprisings than one that must
calculate the possibilities of its soldiers and officials being
injured or killed. 67
This note acknowledges the personal experiences of many who have
discovered that so called "professional police forces" are not always
so professional. "Circumstances may well have changed in regard to
individual defense, although we ignore at our political peril the goodfaith belief of many Americans that they cannot rely on the police for
protection."' ' In fact some Americans will say with vigor that they
often need protection from the police. Like Levinson, I am not of the
opinion that the state is always going to be tyrannical; "I am not an
anarchist."1 69 But I am also not someone who is oblivious to history
or so trustful of the politicians who supposedly represent my interests
so as to begin giving up the rights that are provided in the Bill of
Rights.
Prudentially speaking, the district court in Emerson decided that
the fact that Dr. Emerson was under a temporary restraining order
was not enough to justify the stripping of his individual right to
possess a firearm. The decision states that "[t]he rights of the Second
Amendment must be outweighed by the considering the lengths to
which federal courts have gone to uphold other rights in the
Constitution."'70 The balance of Dr. Emerson's constitutional right
outweighed any interest that Texas had with respect to the temporary
restraining order. The decision cites Ronald Dworkin who advocates
that,
what it means to take rights seriously is that one will honor
them even when there is significant social cost in doing so. If
167. Id-"The decision to use military force is not determined solely by whether the
contemplated benefits can.be successfully obtained through the use of available forces, but
rather is determined by the ratio of those benefits to the expected costs. It follows that
any factor increasing the anticipated cost of a military operation makes the conduct of that
operation incrementally more unlikely. This explains why a relatively poorly armed
nation with a small population recently prevailed in war against the United States, and it
explains why governments bent on the oppression of their people almost always disarm
the civilian population before undertaking more drastically oppressive measures." Id.
168. Id.at 656.
169. Id.
170. Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 610.
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protecting freedom of speech, the rights of criminal defendants,
or any other part of the Bill of Rights were always (or even
most of the time) clearly costless to the society as a whole, it
would truly be impossible to understand why they would be as
controversial as they are. The fact that there are often
significant costs-criminals going free, oppressed groups having
to hear viciously racist speech and so on-helps account for the
observed fact that those who view themselves as defenders of
the Bill of171 Rights are generally antagonistic to prudential
arguments.
E. STRUCTURAL ARGUMENT
"Structural arguments are largely factless and depend on
deceptively simple logical moves from the entire Constitutional text
rather than from one of its parts."'
Bobbitt stresses that we should
not neglect the importance of this form of argument. "Indeed it is a
measure of how habitual our recourse to the text has been that the
most important structural case in Constitutional law, McCulloch v.
Maryland,'7 is commonly thought to base its holding on two textual
passages on which the opinion does not in the main rely-the
Necessary and Proper Clause and the Supremacy Clause."'74
Likewise, the debate over the right to bear arms can also take a
structural format. The district court in Emerson makes slight mention
of the structural approach, nonetheless it still remains a very plausible
and commonsensical approach to the interpretation of the Second
Amendment.
The Emerson decision states, that "[t]he structure of the Second
Amendment within the Bill of Rights proves that the right to bear
arms is an individual right, rather than a collective one."'" s The fact
remains that the Bill of Rights is a list of rights that belong to the
individual, not to the states. "The very inclusion of the right to keep
and bear arms in the Bill of Rights shows that the framers of the
Constitution considered it an individual right. 'After all, the Bill of
Rights is not a bill of states' rights, but the bill of rights retained by
the people."" 76 The Bill of Rights is a list of individual rights with the

171. Levinson, supra note 156, at 658.
172. See Bobbitt, supra note 10, at 74.
173. 17 U.S. 316 (1868).
174. Bobbitt, supra note 10, at 75.
175. Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 607.
176. Id. (quoting David Harmer, Securing a Free State: Why the Second Amendment
Matters, 1998 BYU L. REv. 55, 60 (1998)).
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exception of the Tenth Amendment which "concerns itself with the
rights of the states, and refers to such rights in addition to, and not
instead of, individual rights.""l
Structurally, the states' rights
advocates have a tough burden to bear. Why would the Framers put
a right that, according to the states rights theorists, belongs to the
states directly in the middle a list of individual rights?

IV. LIMITATIONS BY THE STATE ON THE RIGHT TO
BEAR ARMS
A number of philosophies are available when discussing the
possible origin and rationale for the right to bear arms. The
possibilities include, but are not limited to: defense of self, defense of
others, collective defense, defense of the state, sport, and/or maybe
even the enablement of the citizenry to overthrow a tyrannical
government.
Regardless of the reasoning behind the Second
Amendment, it should not be viewed differently than any other right
within the Bill of Rights. The Second Amendment, like any other
right should be subject to certain limitations. Just because a right is
enumerated within the Bill of Rights, does not make the right
absolute in a sense that the individual is isolated from government
interference with respect to that right. That raises the question of
what showing must the State make in order to limit, or in some cases
deprive, the individual's right to bear arms.
Initially, it is important to define who possesses the right to bear
arms. The Emerson decision does this when it states, "[w]hile this
textual exegesis is by no means conclusive, it suggests that 'the
people' protected by the Fourth Amendment, and by the First and
Second Amendments,... refers to a class of persons who are part of a
national community or who have otherwise developed sufficient
connection with this country to be considered part of that
community."' 78
With respect to the Second Amendment, the
individuals who possess this individual right to possess a firearm
should be defined as the law-abiding members of the community.
Law-abiding members of society in this context are those individuals
who have not demonstrated any reason to have that right restricted or
limited.
Judicial limitations on rights that are enumerated in the Bill of

177. David Harmer, supra note 176, at 60.
178. Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 601 (citing United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams,
194 U.S. 279,292 (1904)).
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Rights are by no means unheard of. The First Amendment is a good
illustration of the different forms of analysis that are available when
testing the government's ability to limit an individual's right. "Some
categories of speech are unprotected; others receive minimal
protection, and still others are jealously protected." 1"
After
categorizing the speech or conduct and the right involved, there are
different showings the government must make in limiting it. With
respect to the First Amendment, there is an abundance of case law
available to provide a road map for the analysis. No such road map is
available for Second Amendment analysis.
One of the more well known Supreme Court decisions dealing in
Second Amendment jurisprudence was United States v. Miller."' In
that decision the Court unanimously upheld a federal statute that
made it a crime to transport a sawed-off shotgun in interstate
commerce.
In authoring the opinion, Justice McReynolds
emphasized that there was no evidence showing that a sawed off
shotgun "at this time has some reasonable relationship to the
preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia. ' ..' Furthermore,
he noted that "[c]ertainly it is not within judicial notice that this
weapon is any part of the ordinary military equipment or that its use
could contribute to the common defense."'" Surprisingly, Miller
would have had "a tenable argument had he been able to show that
he was keeping or bearing a weapon that clearly had a potential
military use."'" As a result, a literal reading of Miller can be read to
support a citizen's right to keep and bear bazookas, rocket launchers,
and machine guns because they are "ordinary military equipment...
that... could contribute to the common defense. ' Obviously, this
logic is not the best argument for either side in the collective versus
individual right debate.
The result is that Miller does not answer the "crucial question of
whether the Second Amendment embodies an individual right or
collective right to bear arms""1 nor does it provide a clear test for
reviewing government infringement of that right. The Miller decision
chose to address "a very narrow way to rule on the issue of gun
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

CALVIN R. MASSEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ROAD MAP 468-69 (1997).
307 U.S. 174 (1939).
Id.at 178.
Id.
Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 608.
Id. (citing Miller,307 U.S. at 174).
Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 608.
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possession under the Second Amendment, and left for another day
further questions of Second Amendment construction."' 6
Equal Protection analysis might provide some guidance as to
what may be a permissible level of review for statutory limitations
imposed on the right to bear arms. The three tiers of scrutiny are
available to evaluate under equal protection are minimal scrutiny,
strict scrutiny, and intermediate scrutiny.1" Under minimal scrutiny,
"a challenger must prove that the classification is not rationallyrelated
to any conceivable legitimate state interest. Any legitimate state
interest, however hypothetical, will suffice. "" Minimal scrutiny
"applies to all classifications except those that are constitutionally
suspicious. "'' Strict scrutiny analysis should be applied whenever a
law "employs a suspect classification or substantially infringes upon a
Under this standard of review, the law is
fundamental right."'
presumed invalid and the government must demonstrate that the law
"is necessary to accomplish a compelling governmental interest."
Moreover, the government must show that it has chosen the least
Lastly, under
restrictive way to accomplish the objective. 91
intermediate scrutiny, the government must demonstrate that that the
law is "substantiallyrelated to an importantgovernment interest."1" It
is important under this standard of review that the government's
actual purpose in creating the classification matters, which is not the
case under minimal scrutiny. 93
In developing a permissible level of review for statutory
limitations imposed on the right to bear arms, the Supreme Court will
be free to develop a new standard or possibly use one of the
standards mentioned above. Given the unique nature of the Second
Amendment and the current concern with respect to gun ownership
and violence, I would propose adopting a new standard that is
specifically tailored to the Second Amendment. This new standard
should balance the individual's right against the State's interests.
Initially, it is important to determine the scope and nature of this
supposed individual right. In the preceding discussion of possible
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
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purposes behind the Second Amendment, there is one theme which is
consistent. The notion of defense is commonplace in Second
Amendment discussion. In my view, the amendment is, and should
continue to be broad enough to protect the right of defense, whether
it be of self, of others, or of one's country. It is a lawful justification.
There is nothing illegal or peculiar in ensuring that a citizen has a
reasonable means of defense. As such, the scope of the right to bear
arms should be broad enough to meet the needs of defending one's
self, family, or the collective defense of country, but at the same time
narrow enough not to compromise the government's interest.
Naturally, it would be too broad to say that every citizen has the right
to possess any kind of firearm and can carry it wherever he wants.
Conversely, it would be too narrow to the define the scope of the
right as one only existing when the individual is practicing maneuvers
in a state run militia. The middle ground is what needs to be
determined.
I propose that the law-abiding individual has a constitutional
right to own a firearm only for lawful uses and purposes and that this
right may only be limited by a compelling government interest.
Furthermore, only when the state materially frustrates that lawful use,
should the limitation at issue lose its presumption of validity. Then,
the government should bear the heavy burden of justifying the
limitation of a lawful use by demonstrating a compelling government
interest. The individual has an interest in possessing a firearm for
lawful purposes and uses. The State has an interest in protecting its
citizens from violent crime and gun abuse. Specifically, the State has
a compelling interest in preventing citizens who are non-law abiding
from possessing firearms.
There is a presumption of constitutionality inherent in the laws
passed by Congress. 94 However, this presumption should be
abandoned, and the burden should be shifted when there is a
"material frustration on a lawful use and purpose" of a firearm by a
law-abiding citizen. What is a lawful purpose? What is a material
frustration? What is a law-abiding citizen? What is a compelling
governmental interest in this context? Though these concepts may
develop over time, the following definitions are useful places to begin.
A. Lawful Use and Purpose

The meaning of "lawful use and purpose" cannot be left to the

194. See id.
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legislatures because the result could be evisceration of the individual
right. The legislature could define "lawful use and purpose" as being
only for use in world wars that have been declared by Congress. As a
result, the individual right would clearly be compromised. "Lawful
use and purpose" should be defined with respect to the historically
legal uses of firearms. Examples of "lawful use and purpose" would
be the aforementioned defense of self, others, and the collective
defense of country. It would also include, but not be limited to, other
lawful uses such as hunting and target shooting. The individual
should be able to use a firearm, so long as the use and purpose is
lawful and he is not interfering with a compelling government
interest. Once an individual has used a firearm in an unlawful
manner, the individual's right is subject to limitation by the State.
B. Materially Frustrate
The State should not be able to "materially frustrate" a "lawful
use and purpose" of gun ownership unless there is a "compelling
government interest." Under this formulation, the individual must
demonstrate more than a de minimis infringement of the right, but
less than substantial infringement or evisceration of the right. Hence,
"material frustration." In addition, the government must bear a
heavy burden in limiting the lawful uses or purposes of gun
ownership. Most importantly, the individual must abide the law
before the right will even exist.
In applying this standard, for example, outlawing bazookas
would not be a material frustration on the lawful use of a firearm to
legally hunt a deer during deer season. Moreover, the government
has no compelling interest in preventing someone from hunting a
deer. A hunter would still be able to legally achieve his end without
jeopardizing any state interest. Likewise, the government is not
materially frustrating the hunter's ability to achieve his end. In
achieving their end, hunters need only attain licenses, pass
background checks for firearms, buy deer tags, and have a legal place
to hunt. This is hardly a material frustration. However, from a
commonsense/historical approach, it would be a material frustration
of the Second Amendment to require a deer hunter to throw rocks or
shoot arrows, rather than use a rifle.
What about assault rifles? From a commonsensical/historical
approach to deer hunting, would a ban on assault rifles "materially
frustrate" the "legal use" of a firearm to kill a deer? Under, my
proposed approach, a ban of assault rifles, like bazookas, would not
materially frustrate deer hunters from legally achieving their end.
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What about waiting periods? A ten-year waiting period for a deer
rifle would obviously materially frustrate a law-abiding citizen from
lawfully using a firearm. A ten-year waiting period on a handgun
would likewise materially frustrate the lawful use of target shooting
or home defense. However, the existing 14-day waiting period for a
background check, could hardly be said to materially frustrate a
lawful use of a firearm. Especially when the citizen has notice of the
existence of such a waiting period. Requiring a citizen to plan ahead,
if a firearm is needed by deer season, is certainly not a material
frustration.
Another example of this standard being applied could be with
respect to "smart guns." Smart gun technology is the term used for a
specific type of firearm. Smart guns possess an internal chip which
allow the gun to be fired only by a person possessing a corresponding
chip that is worn in a removable wristband. Should Congress pass a
law requiring handguns to possess this technology, we would have to
ask whether this materially frustrates the legal use of the handgun by
the law-abiding citizen. The gun may cost more and require the
owner to keep track of his chip, but it would not materially frustrate
any plausible legal use of the gun.
C. Non Law-Abiding Citizen
What is a non law-abiding citizen? A non law-abiding citizen, in
the context of this analysis, is an individual who has demonstrated
that they are a threat to the public order. Examples would be
individuals who have been convicted of violent felonies or any gun
related crime. However, conviction of a crime should not be the only
reason to curtail gun rights of an individual. When there has been a
sufficient factual finding that an individual is a threat to public order
by way of gun violence, the right should be able to be limited. I
envision this process being similar to a detention hearing where the
State attempts to demonstrate that the defendant is a threat to public
safety in order to convince the court to raise or deny bail. Once
established as a non-law-abiding citizen and a threat to the public
order, the individual will lose their individual right to possess a
firearm.
A ramification of this proposed approach, is a case by case
determination of the individual, the use, and the limitation at issue.
As, a result, judicial economy will not be promoted initially.
However, the rights found in the Bill of Rights should not be cast
aside for judicial economy. Besides, should the Supreme Court adopt
a test similar to my proposal, guidelines for application of this analysis
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will be developed over time. For example, certain "uses and
purposes" will be determined to be unlawful from a
commonsensical/historical approach. Certain crimes will establish a
person as non-law abiding for purposes of the analysis. Certain
government interests will be determined to be compelling. As a
result, there will be a line of per se uses, crimes, and interests that will
allow judges to dispense with in depth judicial examination. Thus
judicial economy will not suffer to the degree one might initially
contemplate.
V. CRITIQUE OF THE EMERSON DECISION AND
APPLICATION OF THE NEW STANDARD
There is an individual right to bear arms, but that right is not
absolute and the government may limit or take away that right upon a
determination that the individual no longer deserves to possess it.
Under the standard which I have advocated, Dr. Emerson might be
the very the type of individual who should be disarmed. The only
problem is that we do not know what kind of person he is. Since
there was no determination that Dr. Emerson was not law-abiding,
the administration of the statute was clearly unconstitutional. The
restraining order, along with the limitation on his individual right to
bear arms, was forced upon him without any evidence of a dangerous
propensity for violence. The petition for the order stated no factual
basis for relief other than the necessary recitals required under the
Texas Family Code regarding domicile, service of process, dates of
marriage and separation, and the "insupportability" of the marriage.
Moreover, the state divorce court made no findings of any sort of
violence or threats of violence by Dr. Emerson.195 The divorce court
also failed to admonish Dr. Emerson that he would be subject to
federal criminal prosecution for doing nothing more than possessing a
firearm while being subject to the temporary restraining order.1"
I would see no argument against limiting Dr. Emerson's gun
rights if the state court would have found certain facts demonstrating
his propensity to engage in gun related violence. For instance, if he
had specifically said that he was going to shoot his wife or her lover,
he would no doubt suffice as the type of person who should be
disarmed under my proposed standard. I support the District Court
opinion with respect to its determination that an individual right

195. Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 600.
196. See id. at 610.
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exists, however I'm not convinced either way that Dr. Emerson
should be armed or disarmed.
The application of 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(8) still needs to be
evaluated under the proposed standard. The District Court's decision
closely resembles the type of analysis that a court would need to
employ in applying the new proposal. The court wrote that the
statute "is unconstitutional because it allows a state court divorce
proceeding, without particularized findings of the threat of future
violence, to automatically deprive a citizen of his Second Amendment
rights." The District Court shares my concern over the requirement
that the individual be determined to be non-law-abiding. Since the
statute "allows, but does not require, that the restraining order
include a finding that the person under the order represents a
credible threat to the physical safety of the intimate partner or child"
it is capable of materially frustrating a law-abiding individual from
lawfully using a firearm.
The protection of an intimate partner or child from the likely
threat of gun violence would no doubt suffice as a compelling
government interest. However, that threat needs to be established to
the requisite degree of certainty before the State can abridge the
individual right.
If the statute only criminalized gun possession based upon court
orders with particularized findings of the likelihood of violence,
then the statute would not be so offensive, because there would
be a reasonable nexus between gun possession and the threat of
violence. However, the statute is infirm because it allows one to
be subject to federal felony prosecution if the order merely
'prohibits the use of physical force against [an] intimate
partner.' 9'
The fact remains that all that is required for prosecution under the
statute is "a boilerplate order with no particularized findings. Thus,
the statute has no real safeguards against an arbitrary abridgement of
Second Amendment rights"9
The District Court opinion also reflects the proposed standard's
position that an individual may forfeit their Second Amendment
rights. The Emerson court compares the statute at issue with other
statutes. "By contrast, § 922(g)(8) is different from the felon-inpossession statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), because once an individual
is convicted of a felony, he has by his criminal conduct taken himself
outside the class of law-abiding citizens who enjoy full exercise of
197. Id. at 610-11 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)(c)(ii) (1992)).
198. See id. at 611.
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their civil rights.""' Moreover, under the felon-in-possession statute,
the felon is admonished in the state and federal courts that such a
conviction results in the loss of the right to bear arms, along with
other civil rights. The clear problem with the statute in Emerson is
that an individual can "lose his Second Amendment rights not
because he has committed some wrong in the past, or because a judge
finds he may commit some crime in the future, but merely because he
is in a divorce proceeding."'
The individual may not resemble a
criminal at all, but nonetheless, the statute at issue will strip that
individual of his civil right to bear arms, as if they were a criminal.
"There must be a limit to government regulation on lawful
firearm possession. The statute in Emerson exceeds that limit, and
What the new limit will be is
therefore it is unconstitutional."
unknown at this time. Perhaps Emerson, or a case like it will find its
way to the Supreme Court and we will finally be told whether an
individual right to bear arms exists. Furthermore, we may also be
provided with a standard or showing that the government must make
before it may curtail the right to bear arms. There is evidence that the
Supreme Court may be willing to address the issue. Bogus writes that
the "campaign to have the Supreme Court reconsider the Second
Amendment may be winning converts within the Court...."m
Moreover, in Justice Thomas' concurring opinion in Printz v. United
States,' he took notice of the "'growing body of scholarly
commentary' supporting the view that the Second Amendment grants
an individual right."' 5 Justice Thomas hinted that he agrees with the
individual rights position and suggested that "[p]erhaps, at some
future date, this Court will have the opportunity to determine" the
meaning of the Amendment 6 Only time, along with the political
makeup of the Supreme Court, will determine what the Second
Amendment means.
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